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During March 2006, an outbreak of highly pathogenic 
avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) occurred in multiple poultry farms in 
Israel. The epidemiologic investigation and review of out-
break mitigation efforts uncovered gaps in planning for and 
containing the outbreak, thus affording valuable lessons ap-
plicable to other countries in similar settings. 
O
n March 16, 2006, samples taken from a commercial 
turkey farm in southern Israel due to unexpected mor-
tality rates (>0.7% per day) were positive for avian inﬂ  u-
enza subtype H5 by PCR. Highly pathogenic avian inﬂ  u-
enza (HPAI) subtype H5N1 was later conﬁ  rmed by virus 
isolation. Eight more outbreak foci in commercial poultry 
farms in small settlements were identiﬁ  ed within 2 weeks 
(Table 1). We brieﬂ  y describe key ﬁ  ndings of the outbreak 
investigation and lessons learned from our outbreak mitiga-
tion experience.
The Study
Epidemiologic investigation was performed by a joint 
team of veterinary and public health epidemiologists, ad-
ministrators, and law enforcement ofﬁ  cials. Descriptive ep-
idemiology as well as cross-matching of available records 
were also performed to identify common factors associated 
with >2 foci and to establish potential ﬂ  ow of events. These 
records included log books of the affected farms, which 
contained daily mortality rates, identiﬁ  cation of vehicles 
entering, personnel working and visiting the farm in the 
previous 30 days, and afﬁ  liated slaughterhouses.
In February 2006, inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) was detect-
ed for the ﬁ  rst time in Egypt (1); in March 2006, outbreaks 
were detected simultaneously in the Palestinian Authori-
ty’s Gaza Strip and Israel. Later in March 2006, a single 
case was detected in Jordan (2). Molecular characterization 
of the isolates from Israel and Gaza performed in the Vet-
erinary Services Central Laboratory showed that they were 
different from inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) viruses recently isolated 
in Indonesia (3); they belonged to a single strain and were 
closely related to other HPAI (H5N1) strains isolated dur-
ing this period in European, Asian, and African countries. 
Turkey farms, accounting for 10% of Israeli poultry 
farms, were unproportionally involved in this outbreak (6/9 
outbreak foci). The relative prevalence of turkey farms in 
the southern district near the Gaza Strip (50% of farms); the 
close interactions between personnel at farms of the same 
poultry type; and the higher susceptibility of turkeys to avi-
an inﬂ  uenza virus (4) may be plausible explanations. 
Several epidemiologic links between outbreak foci 
were identiﬁ  ed (Table 1). These links and the near-simul-
taneous detection of several outbreak foci speciﬁ  cally on 
turkey farms, increase the likelihood that the virus dis-
seminated through use of shared vehicles or by personnel. 
Alternatively, the involvement of 2 heavy breeder farms 
(farms F, H) characterized by strict biosafety procedures 
to prevent such transmission, and the fact that all 9 farms 
used open sheds, may support the role of migratory birds in 
disease transmission. 
Because all epidemiology-trained veterinarians were 
assigned to regional outbreak containment at multiple foci, 
initiation of coordinated epidemiologic investigation in the 
farms was delayed by up to 10 days. Therefore, precrisis 
allocation of designated epidemiology-trained veterinarian 
investigators and joint investigation team training could be 
an important component of avian inﬂ  uenza preparedness 
plans. 
The key control measures taken, the case deﬁ  nitions 
used, and the guiding principles for oseltamivir prophylac-
tic treatment are summarized in Table 2. Israeli-Palestinian 
cooperation allowed coordination of cross-border mitiga-
tion efforts (5). Overall, these control measures enabled 
full outbreak containment within 17 days, without further 
recurrences (as of August 2007).
Rapid recruitment of teams willing and able to take part 
in culling and burial proved highly challenging. The Israeli 
Ministry of Defense was therefore assigned to coordinate 
and execute these efforts (through its civilian contractors) 
and did so effectively. Teams involved in poultry eradica-
tion activities were instructed to use N95 masks, disposable 
gowns, and safety goggles. Yet in hindsight, the investi-
gation showed that, in some cases, the equipment was not 
used properly (e.g., gowns left open, mask lowered to un-
cover the nose) due to the challenging physical conditions 
in the hot and humid poultry houses. Shorter work shifts 
within the farms and better education of uninitiated work-
ers are therefore key logistical aspects of preparedness. 
Oseltamivir chemoprophylaxis (75 mg/day until 7 
days after last exposure to poultry) was given to all cull-
ing teams, including poultry workers in the 3-km protection 
zones surrounding the infected farm. This policy was in ac-
cordance with European Center for Disease Prevention and 
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Control guidelines (6), but not with the guidelines of Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (7) or the World 
Health Organization (8) that recommend against providing 
prophylactic treatment to low-risk exposure groups. This 
extensive approach proved helpful in recruiting culling 
workers, relieving their fears, and in reassuring the local 
population potentially exposed to the infected poultry. 
Also, only a minute fraction (425 prophylactic courses) 
of the Israeli pandemic preparedness stockpile had to be 
used. 
Timely and full (market price) compensation to farm-
ers was key in encouraging prompt reporting and achiev-
ing trust and cooperation of poultry owners in culling and 
gathering epidemiologic data. Culling was performed by 
administering organophosphate poison in the ﬂ  ock’s drink-
ing water after 24 hours of water deprivation. This method 
proved lacking, as not all birds died as a result of this pro-
cess. In certain cases, birds had to be manually slaughtered, 
a method that potentially exposes workers to increased risk 
for infection. Alternative culling methods such as use of as-
phyxiating foam are now considered for future outbreaks. 
The birds were buried above large polyethylene sheets 
within or in close proximity to the farm, and lime was ap-
plied to accelerate decomposition. Composting, a more en-
vironmentally friendly method that prevents ground water 
contamination (9), is considered for healthy birds culled in 
the protection zone. Only a few valuable birds (i.e., in zoos) 
were vaccinated with stockpiled H5N2 vaccines, because 
in some cases these vaccines may increase circulation of 
H5N1 viruses by allowing asymptomatic infections (10,11) 
potentially leading to continuous silent spread of the dis-
ease among birds (and subsequently to humans).
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Table 1. Confirmed highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) outbreaks in Israel* 
Date (2006) Epidemiologic links (identifiers)
Focus 
ID District Poultry type
Biosecurity 
standards
Increased
no. deaths Report Diagnosis Culling FS SH Vet.
A Southern Meat type 
turkeys
Normal Mar 14 Mar 15 Mar 16 Mar 17 A A,B A
B Southern Meat type 
turkeys
Normal Mar 14 Mar 16 Mar 16 Mar 18 B A B
C Southern Meat type 
turkeys
Normal Mar 15 Mar 16 Mar 17 Mar 20 A B A
D Jerusalem Meat type 
turkeys
Normal Mar 15 Mar 16 Mar 17 Mar 18 A A D
E Southern Broilers Normal Mar 13 Mar 19 Mar 19 Mar 21 A,C C E
F Southern Heavy breeders High Mar 19 Mar 19 Mar 19 Mar 21 D * F
G Jehuda and 
Samaria
Meat type 
turkeys
Normal Mar 21 Mar 21 Mar 22 Mar 23 D * G
H Jerusalem Heavy breeders High Mar 28 Mar 28 Mar 28 Mar 30 A * E
I Southern Meat type 
turkeys
Normal Mar 30 Mar 31 Mar 31 Apr 1 A * B
*No slaughtering took place in the 30 days before or during the outbreak period. ID, identifier; FS, feed supplier; SH, slaughterhouse; Vet., veterinarian. 
Table 2. Veterinary and public health measures taken during the highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) outbreak in Israel, by
proximity to infected poultry 
Location by proximity to outbreak focus 
Measure taken  Infected flock 
Protection zone  
(<3 km) 
Surveillance zone  
(3–10 km) 
Outside outbreak 
area (>10 km)
Management of poultry   Stamping out  Stamping out  Active surveillance: transportation of 
poultry and hatching eggs allowed only 
following PCR testing of samples 
within the previous 72 h 
Passive and active 
surveillance
Poultry products 
management
Destroyed  Destroyed  Released for consumption after  
clinical examination of the laying  
flocks proved negative 
No restrictions
Poultry contacts 
monitoring
Self-monitoring Self-monitoring None None
Case definition of 
human suspected avian 
influenza
Close contact with 
poultry and any ILI* 
Close contact with 
poultry and severe 
ILI†
None None
Oseltamivir prophylaxis 
to poultry contacts 
All poultry contacts 
(including all culling 
and burial teams) 
All poultry contacts 
(including all culling 
and burial teams) 
None None
*ILI, influenza-like illness: respiratory symptoms and fever (>37.5
oC).  
†ILI as defined above, in severity that requires hospitalization. Multifocal Avian Inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) Outbreak
The Israeli public proved quite attentive to risk com-
munication efforts as shown by the results of a national 
telephone survey conducted at the peak of the outbreak by 
the Israeli Center for Disease Control. Among a random 
sample of Israelis >21 years of age, 34 (62%) of 552 in-
terviewees who were aware of the outbreak and generally 
consumed poultry products did not reduce poultry con-
sumption at all due to the outbreak. In contrast, a recent 
preevent survey in the United States has shown that 40% 
of respondents would stop eating poultry products alto-
gether if the H5N1 virus was detected. (12). This outbreak 
was also not associated with a massive increase in “wor-
ried well” hospital admissions. Only 24 patients (21 adults 
and 3 children) came to local hospitals due to self-deﬁ  ned 
or general practitioner-deﬁ  ned suspected avian ﬂ  u during 
March 2006. Five of these 24 persons (4 adults and 1 child) 
indeed met the case deﬁ  nition of suspected case and were 
hospitalized, but none had laboratory-conﬁ  rmed H5N1 in-
fection. These results are probably derived, at least in part, 
from the effective frontline risk communication efforts of 
the district health ofﬁ  cers who offered guidance to local 
general practitioners and the anxious public at the outbreak 
scene. 
Conclusions
Preparedness planning for avian inﬂ  uenza should ac-
count for the unique challenges associated with a simulta-
neous multifocal outbreak, including personnel recruitment 
and allocation; coordination of all parties involved in out-
break mitigation and investigation; simultaneous culling 
and disposal in multiple sites; and coordinated central and 
local risk communication efforts. Outbreak containment, 
even in these settings, could be achieved without the use of 
vaccines, which should be kept as a measure of last resort. 
Case deﬁ  nition and antiviral prophylactic policies may be 
revised ad hoc according to the unfolding events and in 
response to the medical and psychological needs of each 
population. The lessons learned and described in our study 
may serve to reﬁ  ne preparedness plans elsewhere in view 
of the increasing global dissemination of this virus.
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